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Civil mediation in Britain has rapidly moved away from being an option, for private choice, 
to becoming increasingly a compulsory or near-compulsory part of the public justice system. 
But regulation of the mediation industry remains minimal, and undertaken on an essentially 
private, self-regulatory basis. This raises a perception or actuality of risk that mediation and 
its regulation may better serve the interests of stakeholders in the mediation industry than the 
individual citizen who may come to mediation as a one-off player with no available 
alternative dispute resolution mechanism. This article argues that there are ‘public interest’ 
values and expectations of a constitutional and democratic nature at stake here which require 
recognition and protection via an effective and credible regulatory regime. It concludes that 
such a solution may in reality serve the interests both of the mediation industry and those 
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As mediation becomes ever more prominent as a form of dispute resolution in Britain, and an 
increasingly integral part of the civil justice system, it is proper to consider whether 
regulation beyond that which presently exists is necessary or justified. Roberts (2014: 138), 
points towards ‘serious, complicated and unresolved dilemmas of principle and practice’ as 
regards professional regulation of mediation including ‘the distinctive nature of mediation as 
a discrete and autonomous practice; whether mediation should be considered a separate 
profession at all; . . . [and] who should regulate mediators . . .’. Answering such questions 
will not in itself offer a prescription as to the institutional form or regulatory mechanisms 
required, but it will serve as an essential foundation for future consideration of possible 
institutional design. The intention of this article is to encourage a deliberative process, in 
which the objectives of regulation of mediation can be debated as a necessary prior step to 
detailed consideration of appropriate institutional form. Without such debate it should be 
expected that there will simply be continued drift along current lines. 
 
Civil mediation in England and Wales presently occurs in a relatively unregulated context, 
apparently related to a historically voluntary basis for engagement with it. But in recent years 
mediation has become increasingly ubiquitous as an attractive primary means of dispute 
resolution in major commercial contracts (domestic and cross-jurisdictional), offering more 
flexible, less legalistic and more forward-looking approach to that offered by litigation or 
arbitration; companies and corporations, who have recognised advantages in terms of speed, 
cost, efficiency and promotion of positive future relations, routinely utilise it, and 
increasingly will have the potential for mediation as the primary dispute resolution 
mechanism written into contractual agreements. Likewise, as an alternative to conciliation 
and arbitration, mediation has become increasingly commonplace in the context of workplace 
and employment disputes. However, recent shifts towards compulsion or near-compulsion to 
engage with mediation in a range of contexts (via potential cost penalties in civil litigation, 
and Mediation Information and Assessment Meetings in family law) have changed radically 
the historic perception and claim that a central characteristic of mediation was its voluntary 
nature. Though mediation may presently retain its private form, with mediators being private 
individuals facilitating settlement rather than public officials empowered to impose 
judgement, it is proper to observe a shift in its function or nature, from being a genuinely 
private service or commodity, voluntarily engaged with or ‘bought into’, to becoming 
effectively an often near-compulsory feature of the public justice system. 
 




At a theoretical level, many of the recent changes to the context of mediation seem to point to 
a very different, much more pragmatic and less idealistic, vision to that classically stated by 
Fuller (1970: 325), who refers to the ‘central quality of mediation’ in terms of, ‘its capacity to 
reorient the parties toward each other, not by imposing rules on them, but by helping them to 
achieve a new and shared perception of their relationship, a perception that will redirect their 
attitudes and dispositions toward one another.’ In this sense, it may be worth considering 
comparisons with the shift observed by Dezalay (1998) in arbitration, from a focus on 
‘virtue’ to a more pragmatic approach, and one largely dominated by lawyers and legalistic 
argument. 
 
The recent history of legal reform in Britain indicates a clear trend towards Alternative 
Dispute Resolution (ADR) becoming ever more central to the civil justice scene. The Woolf 
Report (1996), as subsequently implemented via the Civil Procedure Rules, in effect imposed 
on parties to litigation a requirement to attempt mediation at an early stage, subsequently 
reinforced by case law (such as PGFII SA v OMFS Company 1 Ltd. [2013] EWCA Civ 
1288), as part of an overall agenda of establishing trial as a last resort. Further pressure on 
disputing parties to pursue alternatives to litigation arise from the Jackson Review (2010) of 
costs, and the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, which have a 
net effect of substantially limiting access to legal aid to fund civil litigation. Most recently, 
the trend towards rendering ADR compulsory was reconfirmed by Lord Justice Briggs’ 
recommendation for a new online court targeted at contributing to ‘making resolution rather 
than determination a culturally normal way of settling civil disputes’. (Briggs 2016) Though 
‘taking the “A” out of “ADR”’ (Fouzder 2016) in this sense may be attractive, the historical 
reality that settlement rather than trial was always the norm in litigation must still be 
acknowledged. It might also be noted that there is also a case for introducing a new ‘A’, for 
‘Appropriate’, which requires an adequate range of choice of dispute resolution mechanism 
which is accessible and appropriately responsive to the needs of different parties and 
circumstances.  
 
Recognition of the increasing public significance of ADR, of which mediation is by far the 
pre-eminent form in civil disputes in Britain, is provided by the establishment in November 
2015 of an All Party Parliamentary Group on ADR, which the Civil Mediation Council 
(CMC) claims to have played a key role in forming. (CMC 2015 and 2016) The nearer 
mediation comes to being part of the established justice system, the more it can be argued 
that ‘public’ expectations become attached to what has hitherto been thought of in terms of a 
private activity. But it is necessary to recognise the realities of the currently dominant 
political perspective on the proper extent of state intervention into ‘private’ activity. From the 
1980s to the present, in Britain the legitimacy of state regulation has been challenged as part 
of a political perspective which presents the legitimate role of the state as more limited than 
was the case for much of the twentieth century. In the current era, responses to any possibility 
of regulation of a field such as mediation might predictably take the form of self-regulatory 




or co-regulatory devices, though a further realistic alternative could be for regulation of 
mediation to be subsumed within pre-existing regulatory arrangements for a cognate field 
such as legal practice. The dominant deregulatory perspective quite reasonably places an 
onus on those proposing or engaging in regulation to justify their actions, typically via 
establishing and identifying with clarity the potential or actual harm which will flow, or 
interests which will be vulnerable if regulation does not take place. 
 
What is clear, however, is that in relation to mediation and ADR more generally there is a 
diverse range of interests at stake which could be negatively impacted either by lack of 
regulation or inappropriate regulatory intervention. The national or state economic interests in 
a flourishing British dispute resolution sector may not necessarily sit easily alongside the 
interests of users of mediation, often identified as ‘consumers’ though this in itself may 
incorporate but mask a divergent range of interests. Beyond these interests, attention needs to 
be paid to the relationship of mediation to the constitutional, democratic and social interests 
associated with the civil justice system. On the face of it, there are competing interests here 
which cannot easily be reconciled in principle or in practice – it may seem that we are in a 
‘zero sum game’, where prioritising any one set of interests would be at the expense of the 
others. Yet the mediator’s quest is for solutions that facilitate parties emerging from a dispute 
with what is of value to them recognised, intact and protected. It is worth exploring whether 




The current context and the competing interests 
 
There exists a clear perception of national economic interest in a thriving and reputable UK 
mediation industry, and encouraging the further development of the UK (and probably 
London in particular) as a dispute resolution centre as an aspect of a broader policy of 
seeking in inward commercial investment. In this context, ADR may actually appear as a 
threat. Thomas (2016) observes a threat to the popularity of London as a dispute resolution 
venue if the common law is not continually refreshed and updated, and identifies increased 
use of arbitration as an obstacle to ongoing development of precedent. 
 
The regulation of mediation (and other forms of ADR) must be viewed in an international 
context. The UK government chose to implement the EU Mediation Directive 2008 
(2008/52/EC) only in its minimal form, rendering it applicable only in cross-border contexts, 
and the Department for Business Innovation and Skills Consultation Document (BIS 2014) 
indicated the same approach in relation to the implementation of the ADR Directive 




(2013/11/EU) and Online Dispute Resolution Regulation (524/2013), relevant to cross-border 
consumer disputes. As with so much else, it is unclear what the future holds in this regard in 
the context of ‘Brexit’. What is clear, however, is that British government has little taste for 
strong intervention in the short-term. 
 
Historically, the UK’s mediation industry has been subject only to a very loose form of 
voluntary registration. The CMC has maintained a voluntary register of members who have 
qualifications from a number of recognised training providers, and who are therefore 
expected to meet standards or codes of conduct established by the various bodies (which tend 
to be similar/parallel in terms of substance). However, it has not been and is still not 
necessary to be CMC registered to offer civil mediation services.  
 
The CMC introduced in 2014 a new ‘twin-track’ approach to registration for those offering 
mediation services. Described by the CMC as ‘a basic system of registration that can offer 
useful information to consumers’, (CMC 2013: 3) it constitutes an effort to offer reassurance 
as to accredited training and qualification, continuing professional development, experience 
and adequate insurance. Mediators may seek registration either as a result of working for a 
‘recognised mediation provider’ which in effect acts as a guarantor of such standards, or as an 
individual meeting the requirements for registration. This might best be described in terms of 
an ‘accredited voluntary register’ (AVR), akin to that in place in certain other ‘emerging 
professions’ such as counselling and psychotherapy. These fields lie beyond the regulatory 
scope of well-established bodies in medicine and nursing (General Medical Council and 
Royal College of Nurses), or even the ‘light touch’ regulatory function exercised by the 
Health and Care Professions Council (2016), where ‘arms length’ oversight of AVRs is 
undertaken by the Professional Standards Authority (2016). To be clear, beyond publicly 
funded family mediation (where Legal Services Commission requirements apply) there is no 
binding requirement for mediators to register in order to practice, and the scheme itself is, as 
the CMC properly acknowledges, strictly limited in its scope. Under the new scheme, though 
the CMC ‘will provide for the possibility of removing or suspending the registration of a 
training course where on investigation it appears that registration has been obtained on an 
inaccurate basis’, it acknowledges explicitly that it ‘is not in a position to set up a fully 
independent mediation standards board that could act as a full-blooded disciplinary 
procedure, even if that was thought desirable’. (CMC 2013: 5) 
 
 
How can we judge whether the regulatory regime is appropriate or adequate? 
 




In the absence of clearly established and expressed rationales for regulation, it is difficult to 
gauge whether the new scheme of registration constitutes appropriate or adequate regulation 
of civil mediation. Prior to establishing the new scheme, the CMC stated that ‘If in due 
course, say after two years, the schemes do not prove to be useful the Board will not persist 
with them. Equally if it is clear that the schemes need to be strengthened or deepened then the 
Council will obviously be sensitive to that also.’ (CMC 2013: 3) Though this public 
commitment to review the operation of the schemes is to be welcomed, it tells us little about 
what the criteria are against which judgement of success or failure will be made. Given the 
lack of clarity about what interests it is intended to serve, or what harms guarded against, how 
will ‘useful’ be measured? In particular, it is necessary to ask ‘Useful to who?’ or which of 
the competing and potentially conflicting various interests in mediation will be prioritised?  
 
In considering regulating a fast-developing field such as mediation, debate may be 
complicated further by the presence of strong pragmatic reasons which may lead certain 
stakeholders to argue, in pursuit of their group interests, for or against regulation or any 
particular form of it. The focus of the CMC Conference 2015 titled ‘Mediation – meeting 
participants’ expectations?’, immediately identifies the interests of participants as one such 
stakeholder group. While this seems to have been intended in that context to refer essentially 
to repeat users of mediation services, such as large companies who actively and regularly 
choose to use it as a form of dispute resolution, it is apparent that ‘participants’ could indicate 
a far from homogenous group. The interests of commercial stakeholders in the mediation 
industry may differ substantially from those of individual users, one-off players who may in 
effect be forced into mediation in the absence of access to the legal system or availability of 
any other form of dispute resolution. 
 
An examination of the mediation industry and its current regulation may reveal a system 
which serves well the interests of providers, trainers, and large corporate repeat-users of 
mediation, within and outside the legal world, operating and protected under the umbrella of 
CMC which consists largely of representatives of such stakeholder groups. If it is left to a 
‘private’ organisation such as the CMC, lacking substantial representation from beyond ‘the 
mediation establishment’, to carry out whatever regulation takes place, there will always be 
concern that whatever processes, practices or principles may be developed will likely reflect 
primarily views and interests from within the groups inside the mediation industry which 
come under its umbrella. 
 
 
What is at stake? 
 




The most prominent claims, relating directly to the values which currently dominate 
mainstream politico-economic thinking in the Western world, are threats of damage to 
consumer interests and to the effective operation of free-markets. Pursuit of such individual 
interests can very clearly be seen as the emphasis of the EU approach as manifested in the 
Directives and Regulations noted above. While such measures tend to reflect and emphasise 
potential risks to the financial interests of ‘consumers’ of mediation, Boon, Earle and Whyte 
(2007: 33) point also to potential injury resulting from disclosure of damaging information 
and/or psychological harm. Though almost certainly not as relevant in civil mediation as in 
the context of psychotherapy or counselling, or other emerging therapeutic contexts, these 
issues of adherence to standards of sound and ethical practice, though remaining strictly 
individual interests, in the context of dispute resolution mediation may also relate to 
expectations of justice. 
 
It can be claimed that the low level of risk or potential harm is evidenced by few law suits 
against mediators – Boon et al. (2007: 35) identify no cases in England where dissatisfied 
parties have sued a mediator, though anecdotal evidence from the US does indicate the 
potential for significant problems to arise. (Hinshaw 2012) It might also be argued that the 
relatively small cost of indemnity insurance available to mediators serves as a further 
indicator of the relatively slight risk of harm which mediation carries. Those pricing 
insurance policies will be astute judges of the level of risk, but what they are ultimately 
concerned with in this context is the risk of any successful claim against a mediator, rather 
than the risk of harm per se. The risk of a mediator being successfully sued is very 
substantially limited by reference to the usual terms written into mediation contracts, and a 
lack of documents other than a settlement agreement evidencing what went on in the course 
of a mediation, plus the very substantial costs attached to pursuing legal action. Lack of 
lawsuits and/or low cost of insurance therefore cannot serve as a sound proxy indicator of the 
absence of problems arising for parties to mediation. Recognition of the potential for harm to 
the interests of vulnerable parties can be assumed to underlie the more interventionist and 
regulated approach adopted to mediation practice in the field of family law where we do see 
some state recognition that mediation can touch on values that go beyond the protection of 
economic and consumer interests and which require intervention and regulation. 
 
While risk of psychological harm or distress would not be relevant to corporate parties to 
mediation, guarantees of ethical practice will be crucial as regards, for example, 
confidentiality and disclosure of information. Other concerns may arise about how mediators 
deal with, or are unable to deal with, power inequalities as between parties, though whether 
this is in reality any more of a problematic issue in this context than in the ‘mainstream’ 
judicial system is debatable. There is no shortage of academic and practical consideration of 
ethics for mediators (e.g. Waldman 2011), and indeed ethical codes do form a small part of 
the training and framework for accreditation established by major mediator trainers. But there 
is little by way of complaint or disciplinary procedure adequate to address breaches of such 




codes or guidance, given the accepted inability of CMC to undertake such activities, and 
indeed ultimately the lack of compulsion for mediators (outside family mediation) to be 
registered at all. As is apparent, the voluntary nature of mediation looks increasingly 
challenged, and as Roberts (2005) observed, referring to family mediation but also of wider 
application, concerns relating to fair process and outcome ‘magnify in respect of mandated 
mediation where the parties, finding themselves in a forum and with a mediator not of their 
choosing, may be both vulnerable and placed under unacceptable pressure to settle.’ While 
some commentators will advocate the sufficiency of longstop supervision by the courts, the 
adequacy of, and access to, legal remedies (arising from, for example, contract, torts or 
fiduciary duties) available to parties unhappy with their experience in mediation is 
questionable and requires scrutiny. All this may form the basis of an argument against 
regulation though it may be that the absence of clear routes for complaints, and the difficulty 
of suing under mediation agreements combined with the potential substantial costs involved 
is actually suppressing the pursuit of legitimate claims and complaints; it is simply 
impossible to be sure. 
 
Beyond such matters of concern to individuals coming into contact with mediation, there is 
also a broader set of collective and citizenship related interests that are invariably ignored in 
debate about the future of mediation and its regulation. These would include questions 
relating to the phenomenon Genn (2010) raises forcefully of how, as mediation becomes ever 
more significant within the justice system, values of substantive justice may be threatened by 
the focus on settlement – vitally important matters, but beyond the scope of the present piece. 
 
If the state begins to exert its power or influence to persuade (or force?) parties to mediate, 
then mediation moves from the private realm to the public, and expectations relating to the 
public justice system begin to come into play. A possible line of justification for regulation 
emerges here, drawing on constitutional ideas of good administration and qualities associated 
with the public justice system which might include matters such as accountability in the 
exercise of power and the absence of unlimited power, equality of treatment for citizens, 
consistency and justice itself, and (within a common law system) precedent, plus potentially a 
need to ensure/confirm that mediation procedures or agreements do not cut across human 
rights or serve to produce unconscionable agreements. Some other potential justifications for 
intervention already touched upon could also be included in this group, for example the need 
to deal properly with complaints relating to mediation, and to driving-up standards and 
professionalization of mediation practice, with high expectations properly attaching to any 
part of the justice system. 
 
As mediation becomes increasingly the only available option for dispute resolution, whether 
as a result of powerful pragmatic reasons such as consideration of cost or it being effectively 
rendered compulsory, so it should be expected that adherence to procedural expectations and 




ethical standards would require statement, maintenance, and where necessary enforcement or 
remedy, via effective regulatory mechanisms. There is little doubt that the general point is 
established that in as far as mediation moves from being a genuine ’alternative’ to the 
mainstream legal system to being part of it, it will need to prove its constitutional and 
democratic legitimacy via the same sort of approaches that apply to any other part of our 
established constitutional framework – via adherence to both substantive and procedural 
standards, against which those who exercise power within it do so accountably. With 
mediation crossing a divide from commodity to constitutional feature, or from the private 
realm to the public, it would seem almost impossible to argue against robust and transparent 
regulation of some kind. 
 
This may be the direction Boon et al. (2007: 34) point us when they claim that ‘Regulation 
secures ADR in the public interest’, or when Roberts (2014: 137) talks of ‘a majority 
consensus, across fields of practice, in favour of a limited form of basic regulation in order to 
ensure that the quality of service provided be monitored and improved in the public interest’. 
But the absence of any definition or specification of ‘public interest’ in such discussion is 
problematic; it is always necessary to ask anyone using this notoriously slippery phrase to 
define precisely what they mean by it in any particular context. Without rehearsing in full 
complex debate regarding understandings of ‘public interest’, always properly to be regarded 
as a contested concept, it can reasonably be stated that damage to interests of society or 
individuals (qua citizens rather than qua consumers) individually and collectively which 
extend beyond the economic interests associated with consumerism, and especially where it 
impacts on expectations associated with equality of citizenship and legitimacy in the exercise 
of public power, might properly be called ‘Public Interest’ rationales for intervention. 
(Feintuck 2004) Such claims, if identified with reasonable clarity, might serve as a useful 




Conclusions – going beyond the zero-sum game 
 
Regulation of mediation, as in any other field of activity, must be appropriate and 
proportionate relative to the objectives of regulation and in particular the actual or potential 
harms it seeks to address. But what is found to be proportionate, the degree and nature of 
regulatory intervention that is indicated, may depend crucially on which set of interests is 
prioritised. An emphasis on national economic interests may suggest the lightest possible 
regulatory touch in order to avoid obstructing growth in the sector. If the interests of 
individuals as ‘consumers’ of mediation are prioritised then the conclusion could be that, in 
the absence of demonstrable harm, such interests are already adequately served by existing 




arrangements. But if collective and citizenship interests relating to justice and democracy are 
prioritised then a powerful case emerges for much stronger regulation, proportionate to such 
important claims and adequately robust and separate from the interests of the mediation 
industry, in order both to ensure a sense of legitimacy and to guarantee these vital social, 
democratic and essentially constitutional values and expectations. 
 
‘Public Interest’ issues at stake involve a range of questions relating to justice and settlement. 
These range from mediation’s potential impact on precedent and development of the common 
law, accountability of mediators in an inherently confidential process (for example in how 
they address power imbalances, or in the difficulty in raising complaints about mediators’ 
actions), to the desirability of permitting the ongoing development of multiple practice 
models which permit creative solutions for parties beyond the win-lose model incorporated 
into litigation, to greater state involvement, and effective compulsion to use mediation as the 
only available dispute resolution mechanism in many cases. It may be that in practice civil 
mediation rarely produces democratically problematic outcomes. But given their potential 
impact on the ability of citizens to encash their expectations as citizens (expectations 
intimately connected to those of ‘justice’), the range and kind of ‘public interest’ matters just 
referred to, may serve as claims which could form a principled basis for intervention. Even if 
they do not all point towards the same manner or degree of regulatory action, if they are 
neglected or inadequately protected it is reasonable to conclude that the public interest is 
threatened and potentially diminished. Though economic and consumer interests may already 
be adequately protected, a very strong prima facie case is established for regulation of 
mediation in pursuit of the protection of citizens’ interests individually and collectively – a 
‘public interest’ properly-so-called. The conclusion has to be that this range of interests are 
not presently protected by existing regulatory arrangements, and nor do they feature 
prominently in debates led by those within the mediation industry. 
 
Given the democratic importance of this group of values, if they are not adequately protected 
and served in regulatory arrangements, the legitimacy and credibility of the mediation 
industry will be fundamentally challenged. Simply put, as mediation becomes increasingly 
near-compulsory so greater regulation, going substantially beyond a scheme of AVR, seems 
indicated. But in the absence of informed and open debate about the principles and priorities 
involved we can expect only further drift down the current route. 
 
Of the four primary approaches to regulating mediation which Alexander (2008) identifies 
(market regulation, self-regulation, formal framework and formal legislative approach) in the 
current British context it seems clear that aside from the possibility of mediation being 
wholly absorbed into the regulatory framework of a cognate field such as law, the first and 
second approaches are the only realistic routes forward, though the second may culminate in 
something more-or-less resembling the third. It is also clear that if a claim of 




professionalization as a basis for self-regulation whether (tacitly or actively supported and 
given legitimacy by the government) is to form a major plank of any structure for the defence 
of mediation’s independence, this will necessitate going well beyond the CMC’s AVR model. 
As mediation becomes effectively compulsory, any registration or accreditation scheme must 
logically expand into a transparently effective regulation scheme, incorporating complaints 
and disciplinary mechanisms, and such a scheme would need to be compulsory. If the CMC 
as presently constituted was found to represent predominantly major ‘players’ within the 
‘mediation industry’, there could also be a strong case for the locus of regulatory authority to 
rest elsewhere than at the CMC, with an alternative body which more obviously reflects and 
prioritises public interest concerns.  
 
Though direct state regulation remains highly improbable in the present climate, some robust 
self-regulatory or co-regulatory response might well be indicated. There is clearly a risk that 
the CMC in its current form will attract a perception of risk of fusion or confusion of the roles 
of overseer of and trade association for the civil mediation industry. Such perceptions matter 
- it is hard to believe that in relation to the medical profession, anybody would consider it 
acceptable for the ‘trade association’ role of the British Medical Association to be fused with 
the regulatory role of the General Medical Council, yet this is precisely the position that the 
CMC presently seems to hold as regards mediation. 
 
There may be much worth defending in a mediation sector operating further beyond the 
mainstream legal world than does the other most prominent form of ADR for civil disputes, 
arbitration; Roberts and Palmer (2009: 363) note that ‘ . . . it will only be through the survival 
of the “mediator” as an independent professional that distinctive standards and institutions of 
quality assurance will crystallise’. Defence of its independence will be stronger if based more 
on public interest values and less on consumer interests or perceptions of industry self-
interests such as those manifested in an approach which may appear to emphasise the 
expectations of corporate users and the mediation industry that serves them. If a credible 
regulatory regime drawing legitimacy from incorporation of ‘public interest’ values is not 
achieved, much of what is actually and potentially of value in an independent mediation 
sector will be under risk of takeover from or absorption into the established processes of a 
cognate industry such as law. 
 
Mediators routinely use a device of inviting parties to reflect on the Best and Worst 
Alternative to a Negotiated Settlement, and the mediation industry or its representatives 
might usefully engage in this process now. If they reflect on the likely outcomes if they do 
not create an effective and credible regulatory regime for themselves, the potential for loss of 
credibility and the independence of the sector being diminished by regulation of mediation 
being absorbed into the regulation of the legal professions, this should logically serve as a 
sufficient ‘nudge’ to persuade them to pursue what is the best alternative to this. Fortunately, 




this situation does not have to be viewed as a zero sum game in which only one set of values 
or interests can prevail at the expense of the other; the classic mediator’s objective of a ‘win-
win’ solution presents itself by way of an alternative. Based on what has been argued in this 
article, it is in the interests both of those parties who use mediation services, and of society 
collectively, for the public interest values involved in mediation to be properly prioritised and 
protected within an effective and transparent regulatory regime; a regime which to be 
legitimate must be clearly separated from the interests of ‘the mediation industry’. This may 
appear to run counter to the interests of presently powerful groups such as the CMC and the 
large scale providers and users of mediation services which it seems to represent. However, 
in as far as such a move would protect the ongoing credibility, and hence further the 
development of mediation, in reality it would serve their interests while simultaneously 
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